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The purpose of this article is to consider the official discourse of politics of memory in contem-
porary Russia regarding commemoration of the October revolution. Since the issue caused 
serious discussions about the value attitude to the Soviet past in Russian society this article 
addresses the analysis of how the October Revolution is remembered in today’s Russia and 
what it symbolizes from the viewpoint of such selected actors as politicians, citizens and media.
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S T R E S Z C Z E N I E
Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie oficjalnego dyskursu dotyczącego polityki pamięci 
we współczesnej Rosji w odniesieniu do upamiętnienia rewolucji październikowej. Kwestia 
ta wywołała poważne dyskusje na temat pojmowania wartości w odniesieniu do radzieckiej 
przeszłości w rosyjskim społeczeństwie, dlatego w tym artykule proponuje się rozważyć, jak 
rewolucja październikowa jest pamiętana w dzisiejszej Rosji i co symbolizuje z punktu widzenia 
takich aktorów, jak politycy, obywatele i media.
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INTRODUCTION
C ommon picture of the past is one of the main pillars of the identity of modern society. Politics of memory cannot exist without efficient communication between state and society as the attitude to some 
historical moments substantially depends on actual political discourse in 
a country. However, the subject of politics is not the past itself, but social 
beliefs about the past based on so-called collective memory – “socially shared 
cultural knowledge of the past, which is formed on different sources and is 
characterized by fundamental incompleteness and selectivity” (Efremova & 
Malinova, 2018, p. 116). Thus, the picture about a specific event is possible to 
be distorted by simplifications and emotional factors with a view to facilitate 
its perception by the group members as something “obvious”. It is worth 
bearing in mind that the collective past may be affected by certain interpre-
tations. The elites often tend to pursue the objectives goals not necessarily 
forming a specific concept of the past: they might seek to legitimize their 
own power, justify their decisions or influence values, attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviors of the society (ibid., p. 117). It is therefore appropriate to conclude 
that politics of memory is directed at the present and future, serving as an 
attribute of social influence by means of forming cultural infrastructure, 
educational policy and legislative regulation.
According to historian Peter Carrier (1996, p. 435) “commemorations, 
whether occurring „naturally” after a predictable lapse of time, or else or-
ganized in order to diffuse and implant a specific interpretation of the past” 
basing on “elements of both the original event and the new context within 
which the commemorative „event” takes place”. Therefore, commemoration 
activities in terms of collective memory concept may serve as a pretext for 
political use of the past and have different interpretations in the context of 
the current political agenda (Efremova & Malinova, 2018, p. 119). The process 
of selection of what is to be remembered and forgotten is important in this 
regard. Remembrance refers to what is essential in retrospect, whereas forget-
fulness – to what appears to be no longer useful details. A case in point might 
be not merely historical facts, but also emotional connection to them, where 
any mismatch can be the basis for conflicts of “memory”. Sociologist Iwona 
Irwin-Zarecka (1994, p. 90) shares these views stating that remembrance might 
have its own infrastructure: “parts of it might be continuously in use, while 
other parts remain unattended for long stretches of time”. Monuments, mu-
seums, holidays, literature and arts may exemplify the infrastructure serving 
as a symbolic source, which meaning often changes over time.
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Particular attention should be given to commemoration practices such as im-
portant dates on the calendar – holidays or anniversaries. Their standardization 
and repeatability may be considered as a reliable socialization tool. However, it 
requires updating with time, for younger generation needs new cultural represen-
tations to form an emotional bond to the past (Ensink, 2003, pp. 10–11). By way of 
instance, commemoration of historical events also needs proper media coverage 
to transfer historical knowledge and collective memory. It is worth recalling that 
although media might be an important attribute of shaping picture of the past, 
they may omit some details and/or present different elements of history from 
a certain perspective. This may influence the way of perception of the present 
and future about history, identity and memory by the citizens (Bałdys & Piątek, 
2016, pp. 67–68). It should be noted, however, that the process of recreating an 
objective picture of the events of that time in its entirety is complex, for its pre-
sentation consists of many factors, which are subject to shifts in interpretations 
by different actors. Thus, drawing on theoretical framework, in this article it 
is supposed to consider how the October Revolution is remembered in today’s 
Russia and what it symbolizes from the viewpoint of such selected actors as pol-
iticians, citizens and media. The method of secondary data analysis was chosen 
for the purposes of framing the official Russian discourse of politics of memory 
and public opinion regarding the anniversary of the revolution. Presentation of 
Russian media discourse in the context of the October revolution was based on 
secondary analysis of the “Center for Russian Political Culture Studies” report 
discussing the results of media monitoring. Moreover, the study was conducted 
on the basis of a content analysis of the narratives appeared in the evening news 
program “Vremya” on the main Federal channel “Pervyy kanal” on the day of 
the celebration the anniversary of the October Revolution (November 7, 2017). 
The analysis was based on the following questions: Total duration of the program? 
Duration of the narratives regarding the revolution and the 1941 parade? How the 
revolution and the 1941 parade were presented? The data was coded and assessed 
in accordance with the needs of categorizing the answers. Research results are 
described in the following sections.
GREAT OCTOBER SOCIAL REVOLUTION: CHANGING 
PERSPECTIVES
Numerous issues appeared in connection with commemoration of the 
100th anniversary of the October Revolution. Before considering the contem-
porary understanding of the event, it is necessary to give a quick overview 
of changing perspectives of its perception from the moment of its inclusion 
in the Soviet history.
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The October Revolution is known to be an armed insurgency started 
in Petrograd (St. Petersburg) in 1917 on November 7 (October 25)1 that 
brought Bolshevik Party to power. This date turned into an official state 
holiday in 1918. Its commemoration became a military parade gradually 
growing into the main holiday of the USSR. However, it was relevant only in 
terms of historical context that was political in nature: the holiday may have 
emphasized the significance of new political order being a consequence of 
revolutionary events (Anikin, 2014, p. 140). Until the end of Stalin’s regime, 
the October revolution served as a general myth about genesis of the USSR 
where prerevolutionary past turned into the prehistory of the rebellion.
A political discourse in terms of politics of memory has been changing 
in 1950–1980s in the USSR. In this period, one could observe a process of 
romanticization of the 1917 event by politicians: it was “glorified as a Lenin-
ist project of ‘genuine’ communism, from which Stalin allegedly retreated, 
defaming the revolution with bloody and unreasonable violence” (Narskiy, 
2017, p. 79). At the same time, the Victory over Fascism of the Soviet Union 
served as a justification for the time of Stalin’s terror. After the collapse of the 
USSR there was a redefining of the revolution several times in the 1990s and 
2000s. Igor Narskiy (2017) argues that “the October Revolution for the first 
time officially fell into the shadow of war, when November 7 was declared the 
Day of Military Glory in 1995”. The holiday itself may have become mourning 
for all victims of the civil war. However, since it is possible to consider the 
revolution from different perspectives, a question may have risen here: how 
do different actors understand this event in contemporary Russia in terms 
of the 100th anniversary of the October events in 2017?
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL DISCOURSE
Authorities’ interpretation of history has always played one of the most 
important roles in society’s self-determination and self-identification. October 
Social Revolution was celebrated every year on November 7 in the Soviet Union. 
“The education of Soviet citizens was based on the fact that due to October 
they live in a completely new type of state” (Saprykina, 2016, p. 63). However, 
after the dissolution of the USSR Russia experienced changes of emphasis 
and restructuring of strategic approach in official Russian discourse related 
to the anniversary of the October revolution (Kochneva & Fredovna, p. 18).
During post-soviet period, the authorities have been committing to the pol-
icy of desovietization “aimed at displacement of high meanings of “November 
1 The first date is based on the Julian calendar, whereas the second – on the 
Gregorian one.
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7” from collective memory of Russians” (ibid.). In 1991 common parades and 
demonstrations were cancelled in relation to changes in the political situation 
that entailed transformation of symbolic discourse. In 1992 the government de-
cided to reduce number of days off (one on November 7 instead of two on No-
vember 7–8) devoting to the memory of the revolution. Until 1995 the holiday 
used to be called as “The day of 1917 October Revolution” (O dnyakh voinskoy 
slavy i pamyatnykh datakh Rossii, 1995), however, in 1996 in accordance with 
the Presidential decree No. 1537 “About the day of concord and reconciliation” 
it was claimed that “1917 October Revolution radically influenced the fate of 
our country. In an effort to continue to prevent confrontation, in order to unite 
and consolidate Russian society, I decide: 1. To declare a holiday on November 
7 as The Day of Consent and Reconciliation. 2. To declare 1997 to be the year 
of the 80th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Year of Concord and 
Reconciliation” (O dne soglasiya i primireniya, 1996).
In 2004 Presidential decree renamed the holiday to “The day of the 
military parade on the Red Square in Moscow to commemorate the twen-
ty-fourth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution (1941)” (O 
vnesenii izmeneniy v statyu 1 FZ № 32..., 2004). However, since 2005 one has 
been able to observe new shifts in interpretations of November 7. A newly 
established holiday – the Day of National Unity – is celebrated in Russia 
now every year on November 4 (see: Russkiye prazdniki...). It is worth noting 
that the parade itself was held for the first time in 1941. Further celebra-
tion was more likely related to the memory of the Great Patriotic War, but 
not to the revolutionary events. In 2011, there was a reconstruction of the 
military “parade 1941” on the Red Square, with the Red Army regiments 
marching directly to the front (Anniversary of Russia’s..., 2014). The date of 
1941 emphasized the importance of the holiday according to the speeches 
of politicians and official statements (Anikin, 2014). However, the parade 
was put into the context of the battle near Moscow as the beginning of the 
Nazi invaders’ defeat. Thus, one can observe the substitution of symbols, 
where the memorial itself becomes the source of commemoration. Notably, 
position of the authorities is influenced by “overcoming the social-class and 
political-party approaches practiced in Soviet historiography in assessing 
the historical significance of the October Revolution” (Kochneva & Fredov-
na, p. 19), because it may have bad effects (like radicalization and split) on 
contemporary Russian society.
On the threshold of anniversary, the discourse of revolution’s commem-
oration was reserved and could be defined as “quiet” without any official 
celebrations at a high political level and festivities (ibid., p. 20). For instance, 
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the Press Secretary of the President Dmitriy Peskov questioned the need 
for its celebration (A zachem eto prazdnovat, 2017). Olga Rusakova and 
Elena Kochneva supposed it is connected with “the policy of neoliberal part, 
which pursues a course on desovitization as a strategic approach in politics 
of memory” (Kochneva & Fredovna, p. 20). Although these ideas are not 
dominant among the members of parliament, these discourse and intentions 
deeply influenced elite’s mind, “where the source of the negative that was in 
the Soviet system is the October revolution” (ibid.).
In 2014 President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin assessed Bol-
shevik’s actions very critically during the meeting with history teachers and 
young scholars: “The period of the civil war is a very difficult test for all of our 
people, good or bad, but the Bolshevik slogans and posters looked brighter, 
more concise and acted certainly more efficiently. Among other things, it 
was still fashionable, because no one wanted the continuation of the war; 
they were in favor of ending the war. It’s true, they cheated the society. Well, 
of course, you know: “The land is for the peasants, the factories are for the 
workers, and peace is for the people!” The peace was not given, because the 
civil war began, the factories and land were taken away, nationalized, so that 
a scam” (Putin rasskazal ob izyashchnom naduvatelstve..., 2014). Here it is 
also relevant to pay attention to Putin’s speech to the Federal Assembly in 
December 2016. It was based on public awareness of the idea of civic concord, 
reconciliation and national unity: “We need the lessons of history, first of all, 
for reconciliation, for strengthening the social, political, civil accord that 
we have been able to achieve today. It is unacceptable to drag splits, anger, 
resentment and the hardening of the past into our present life, in our own 
political and other interests to speculate on the tragedies that have touched 
almost every family in Russia, no matter which side of the barricades our 
ancestors turned out to be then. Let’s remember: we are one people and we 
have only one Russia” (Glava RF poprosil..., 2016).
Putin also showed his critical attitude towards Vladimir Lenin and his 
theory of political management in January 2016 during the meeting of the 
Council for Science and Education: “It is right to control the flow of thought; 
it’s only necessary so that this thought would lead to the correct results, and 
not like in the case of Vladimir Ilyich. Ultimately, this thought led to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. [...] There were many thoughts: autonomization 
and so on. They laid an atomic bomb under the building, which is called Rus-
sia, and it jerked afterwards. And we did not need a world revolution” (Putin 
vyskazalsya o Lenine, 2016). Later in 2017, Putin claimed during the meeting 
of the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights that 
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he expects “this date will be perceived by the society as summing up the 
dramatic events that divided the country and the people” (Sinitsyn, 2017).
Considering all above one can see that the October revolution has differ-
ent assessment of politicians. From the one hand, Russia does not refuse the 
relevance of the anniversary for Russian people. On the other hand, the state’s 
authorities define it in quite an abstract way with predominantly negative 
attitude to some aspects of the event. Certain beliefs are rooted in “modern 
phobias of the political establishment, which fear of losing legitimacy and 
power resources in case of “colour revolution” scenario could be implemented 
in Russia” (Kochneva & Fredovna, p. 23). Prime minister of Russia Dmitriy 
Medvedev might prove this idea. He mentioned during plenary meeting of the 
party “United Russia’s” the forum that Russia “don’t need revolutions at all” 
as they “have already reached our limit in the last century” (Babushkin, 2016).
Since the elites are likely to ignore references about revolutions in Russia, 
one can suppose that the authorities are trying to avoid every manifestation 
of rebellion. To complete the picture, it would be useful to pay attention to 
citizens’ attitude towards the commemoration of the October revolution.
COMMEMORATION OF THE EVENT BY CITIZENS
Understanding of the revolution events of 1917 has no consensus among 
academic society. Discussions about this issue led scholars to a solution of con-
sidering it to be an aggregate of revolution events taking place in February and 
October till the beginning of the Civil War (Aleksandr Chubarian – o novom 
uchebnike istorii..., 2013). According to the research study by Mariya Dontsova 
and Irina Tazhidinova (2017) for most Russians the scholar’s solution is not 
appropriate. Their study is based on student survey (held in 2017 among 17 
students of physics and technical faculty and 86 – of history and international 
relations faculty of Kuban State University) with the purpose of revealing the 
“state of the historical memory of October 1917, the modern public mood about 
the revolutionary past of the country” (ibid., p. 16). According to the survey, 
most of students (76%) named Russian Social Democratic Labour Party as the 
one who had led the revolution. Its head was called in 85% of cases. Dontsova 
and Tazhidinova argue that a question about the associates of the leader had 
more problems. However, students’ choice fell on Trotskiy and Stalin. The 
authors insist on conscious decision making reflecting on like-mindedness, 
for Trotskiy was mentioned most frequently. The situation is more complex 
in case of naming the city, where the event began. Majority of physics and 
technical faculty students chose Moscow (59%) whereas most of history and 
international relations faculty students (FHIR) – Petrograd (79%). Ideas of 
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revolutionaries, according to FHIR students’ opinion, underlie the works of 
Karl Marx in 92%. As for students of physics, K. Marx was mentioned only 
in 65% of cases. Besides they named Emmanuel Kant (18%), Charles Darwin 
(6%), while 12% was unsure. With regard to the question about separation of 
October and February events, the survey shows that students did not always 
do it: most of them were sure the revolution provided to loss of political power 
by Nicolas II in autumn 1917. Only 45% of FHIR and 24% of physics gave the 
right answer, having chosen Provisional Government.
It is worth emphasizing that the authors of the research argue that major-
ity of students learned about the revolution from schools (FHIR – 95% and 
physics – 82%), universities (34% and 18%) or from artwork (film, literature 
etc.). Media as a source of the information was not favored among young 
people (12–28%) that “may indicate either lack of coverage by Russian media 
of country’s revolutionary past or lack of interest among students themselves 
in such information, even if they are not ignored by the media” (ibid., p. 17). 
Relatively infrequent source for 30% of FHIR and 15% of physics students 
were members of the family.
Attitude to the revolutionary events and perception of their connection 
with the present by today’s youth remains either ambiguous or negative. 
Students described the definition of revolution as “coup d’etat” or “changes” 
(“…of the system” or “…of the State structure”). As the research shows these 
connotations were associated with mentions of fear, threats, uncertainty or 
anxiety for the people who had witnessed that period of history. This may 
explain why most respondents were unable to say what consequences of the 
event had been for the country. On the other hand 33% of FHIR and 41% of 
physics students considered the revolution to be “an ambitious social exper-
iment” or “a tragedy of Russia” (33% and 12% respectively). Only minority 
argued for “a boon to Russia”.
Significance of the revolution is estimated as critical (regression) by 42% 
of FHIR and 29% of students of physics. However, it was evaluated as pos-
itive (progress) by 35% of FHIR and 59% of students of physics. It is worth 
noting that although absolute majority see the anniversary as unnecessary to 
celebrate, they are unlikely to bury the holiday into oblivion. Hence, despite 
“predominantly negative perception of the consequences of the revolution 
for the development of the country” the young people present no categorical 
attitude (ibid.). Since the role of media attention was partly mentioned in 
the research study, it is proposed to consider the Russian media discourse 
in the context of the commemoration of the October revolution.
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MEDIA ABOUT THE REVOLUTION
The topic of the October Revolution did not find popularity with the 
national media. According to the report of the “Center for Russian Political 
Culture Studies” (Spustya sto let..., 2017) mentions about the revolution in 
federal media were growing slowly until 2016 (see Pic.1). The sharp increase 
in media attention to the topic was noticeable from the third quarter of 2016.
Picture 1. The mention of the October revolution in the federal media in 2007–2017.
Source: Center for Russian Political Culture Studies
The greatest number of publications about the oncoming anniversary 
appeared in 2017. However, the numbers varied each month and mentions 
regarding the topic were slowly gaining momentum until October (see Pic. 2).
Picture 2. The mention of the October revolution in the federal media in January–October 2017.
Source: Center for Russian Political Culture Studies
The picture shows that there were 1,240 federal publications during re-
gional elections in August. It was 10–15 percent more than in the previous 
few months. From September media attention to the commemoration topic 
increased markedly (and even twice in October). Notwithstanding, a so-
ciological survey in October (based on opinion of 1500 respondents from 
different regions) noted the trend in low level of public attention to the 
anniversary of the revolution, for three-fifths of respondents (58 percent) 
consider that the issue did not have proper media coverage (ibid.). Less than 
a third of Russians (29 percent) stated they had known or had heard about 
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preparations for the anniversary event. Part of respondents, who were not 
interested in this topic, was approximately 3 percent. Moreover, the authors 
of the report point out a correlation between an age cohort and awareness 
of the event. The level of interest was the lowest among young people aged 
25 to 29, whereas it was one third below average in the age group forty and 
under. The highest rate recorded in the 45–49 and 65–69 age range. The 
authors further noted that supporters of opposition parties had much higher 
awareness of the topic than electorate of the ruling party (“United Russia”) 
or those who vote “against all” or abstain.
According to these figures, it turns out that public attention was not 
focused on the anniversary of the revolution. This raises the question of 
what topics dominated the internal media discourse. TV coverage tended 
to broadcast traditional foreign policy topics including situation in Ukraine, 
crisis in relations with the West and war in Syria. However, there were shifts 
in emphasis towards “the scandal around a major failure of the state cultur-
al policy” (ibid.). The film Matilda (Uchitel, 2017), dedicated to the 100th 
anniversary of the October Revolution, was accused of utilizing political 
campaigning. Instead of proposing deliberation of the cause and historical 
consequences of the revolution, the vector of public attention was directed 
to the movie about the romantic relationship between Nikolay Romanov and 
the ballerina Matilda Kshesinskaya (Spustya sto let..., 2017). According to the 
report, the number of references to the October revolution and Matilda was 
comparable in the beginning of 2017. However, the number of publications 
about the movie increased rapidly in August (see Pic. 3).
Picture 3. Mentions of the scandal around the film Matilda in federal media in January–October 2017.
Source: Center for Russian Political Culture Studies
There were ten times fewer mentions about the October revolution than 
about Matilda in media in September 2017. A similar trend was also observed 
in social networks: public attention to the film decreased, while the interest 
in the revolution increased. Despite the different dynamics, the number of 
references to the movie was “more than five times higher than to the October 
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revolution”. Nevertheless, the media attention was diminishing by the time 
of the official premiere of the film (October 23). Subsequently, the topic was 
replaced by the news of the nomination of new presidential candidate in the 
person of Kseniya Sobchak (ibid.).
No less interesting is media attention on the day of the celebration the 
anniversary of the October Revolution (November 7, 2017). Since television 
remains the main source of information in Russia by different estimations 
(Kanaly informatsii, 2018; Doveryay..., 2017), it is proposed to consider the 
narratives appeared in the evening news program “Vremya” on the main 
Federal channel “Pervyy kanal”. The program showed the news mostly about 
external policy (e.g. Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam or USA) and/or situation in 
the world. The Picture 4 presents the share of narratives about both the 
Revolution and the 1941 parade during the news program’s broadcasting.
Picture 4. Share of the selected narratives on TV program “Vremya”
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Source: own elaboration
The entire duration of “Vremya” program on November 7 was about 29 
minutes. However, the information about the events demonstrated a low 
media attention (10–11% or about 3 minutes in average). It may confirm 
the assumption mentioned previously that the anniversary itself was not 
relevant for most elites. Communist Party of Russian Federation was the 
only authority cited by the media: “in honor of 100 years of the October 
Revolution, the representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Fed-
eration organized a march in the center of Moscow” (“Vremya”, November 
7). The leader of the party Gennady Zyuganov claimed that “Aurora’s shot 
gave all the inhabitants of the planet the point of Marxism-Leninism and 
the great idea of freedom and happiness that every worker on earth deserves. 
Any lie, dirt and intrigue trying to silence the great October and turn over 
his immortal conquests are unworthy of our attention”. The revolution was 
described as “the main event of the year, if not decades” or “100 years ago 
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here in the center were the bloody battles of the Bolsheviks” (“Vremya”, 
November 7). Foreign delegations were mentioned once as “guests from 
80 countries”, including those who are from Brazil, Catalonia and Greece.
1941 parade was considered to be a solemn commemoration. The present-
er and the journalist described it as “a solemn parade in Moscow in memory 
of the legendary parade of 1941, whose participants went to defend the capital 
from the Red Square”, “on the square, grandsons and great-grandchildren 
of the winners, who left to the front in the autumn of 1941 from the walls of 
the Kremlin”, “march of holy war” (“Vremya”, November 7). In comparison 
with the October revolution, parade the 1941 parade was presented as much 
more significant and positive issue. It is worth noticing that Putin or any 
other politicians from the government (except left-wing party) have never 
been mentioned during the narrative about both the Revolution and 1941 
parade. Hence, it confirms once again how indifferent the authorities are 
towards some sites of collective soviet memory.
CONCLUSIONS
Analysis of the official Russian discourse of politics of memory regard-
ing the commemoration of the October revolution showed some results. 
Russian elites have an ambiguous approach to this historical phenomenon. 
Contradiction between the historical significance of the October revolution 
and negative reflection of the authorities towards any revolutions in gen-
eral. Moreover, they did not manage to offer the society a good definition 
of contemporary understanding of the issue. “The ‘reconciliation strategy’ 
has come into conflict with the official negative assessments of the practice 
of Soviet state-building” (Kochneva & Fredovna, p. 26). Commemoration 
of the event becomes an instrument for political manipulations in terms of 
the way of interpretations that are appropriate for the officials. For instance, 
policy of desovietization was implemented in post-soviet period with the 
discourse of persuasions that the October revolution contributed to criminal 
and totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime.
The research study by Mariya Dontsova and Irina Tazhidinova shows 
that majority of young people see the anniversary as unnecessary to cel-
ebrate. However, respondents state that the holiday should not be buried 
into oblivion. According to the researchers, there is no categorical attitude 
towards the anniversary, even though the students show “predominantly neg-
ative perception of the consequences of the revolution for the development 
of the country”. Furthermore, public enquiry shows lack of proper media 
coverage of preparations for the anniversary of the October Revolution. 
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As an alternative, there were only ‘necessary’ images of official position of 
elites. Media discourse took the form of silence towards the anniversary or 
substitution for related topics as distracting campaigns, instead of propos-
ing deliberation of the results, lessons and modern heritage of the October 
revolution.
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